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WHY THE PRESIDENT MUST VETO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BILLS
Saikrishna Prakash*
It has become customary for Presidents to sign bills they regard as unconstitutional.
Modem Presidents often sign such bills into law and, somewhat incongruously,
issue concurrent signing statements that decry one or more features of such bills as
unconstitutional.' We can call this practice "Sign and Denounce."
Most defenses of Sign and Denounce perhaps rest on three claims. First, Sign
and Denounce seems an entrenched feature of recent presidencies, so much so that
the practice has added a gloss to the Constitution. Second, some assert that it would
be impractical for the President to veto bills merely because one or more provisions
were unconstitutional. Bills are often products of complicated and time-consuming
legislative wrangling and compromise and frequently contain provisions that a
President regards as necessary for the continued well-being and safety of the nation.
It would be onerous and unrealistic to require the President to veto such bills when
the bill's constitutional provisions are so critical.2 Finally, some believe that if a bill
contains unconstitutional provisions, those provisions are void by virtue of their
unconstitutionality such that signing the entire bill is of no moment. In other words,
even if a President signs a bill containing unconstitutional provisions, such pro-
visions have no legal effect precisely because they are unconstitutional.
In this short piece, I argue that the President has a duty to veto bills when he
believes they contain provisions that are unconstitutional. 4 He acts contrary to his
* Herzog Research Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to Michael
Rappaport for comments.
See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Ass't Att'y Gen., to Bernard N. Nussbaum,
Counsel to the President, The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, (Nov.
3, 1993) [hereinafter Dellinger Memorandum], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/
signing.htm; Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307 (2006) (discussing the practice under George
W. Bush).
2 See Bradley & Posner, supra note 1, at 360.
3 Id. at 359.
' When I say that a provision is unconstitutional, I mean that the provision either
requires an actor to take an unconstitutional action or permits the actor to take such an action.
To take the simplest case, if a bill is unconstitutional in all of its applications, the President
must veto the underlying bill. For instance, if a bill required the ouster of all Article III
judges, the President must veto the bill.
But a bill's provisions need not be unconstitutional in all their applications for the
President's duty to veto to apply. For instance, consider a statute that commanded the
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constitutional obligations when he ushers into law bills that he regards as unconsti-
tutional. He can no more Sign and Denounce then he can "Propose and Denounce,"
that is, propose unconstitutional legislation even as he denounces it as unconstitu-
tional. Sign and Denounce is one of those practices that should be consigned to the
ash heap of history, like communism and bell bottom pants.5
To see why this is so, we need some sense of the President's constitutional obli-
gations. The duty to veto arguably arises from one of three sources. The first is a
general, implicit sense, arising from the Constitution, that neither the President nor
any other federal officer can violate the Constitution. The Constitution clearly creates
law and any officer created pursuant to that supreme law is barred from acting
contrary to the Constitution that helps legitimize his or her actions. For instance, the
President could not raise an army on his own authority because the Constitution
never grants him this authority. Indeed, it would be inconsistent for a President to
take actions violative of the very document that creates and sustains the institution
of the presidency. This implied obligation to refrain from violating the Constitution
coheres with people's intuitions about the nature of constitutions and their
understanding of the duty of agents more generally. Agents are not to transgress the
very agreement or contract that creates them and gives rise to their duties as an agent.6
President to appoint all officers of the United States without the concurrence of the Senate.
As applied to non-inferior officers, this provision is unconstitutional because the President
needs the Senate's consent before appointing such officers. As applied to inferior officers,
however, the provision is constitutional. Though the provision will be constitutional as
applied to inferior officers, the duty to veto applies to this hypothetical bill because it con-
veys some power that Congress cannot grant. Congress clearly wanted the bill to apply to
non-inferior officers, and if the President concludes as much and believes that aspect of the
bill is unconstitutional, he must veto the entire bill.
The general inquiry is whether the President believes that the bill has unconstitutional
applications as he best understands the bill and the Constitution. I do not believe that the
President must veto every bill that is merely susceptible to an unconstitutional reading, for
then he would be forced to veto every bill. All bills and statutes are susceptible to unconstitu-
tional readings in the hands of a President or a Supreme Court bent on pursuing some
agenda. When the concern is that future actors may misread the bill or statute and then take
unconstitutional actions based on those misreadings, then the President, it seems to me, has
a discretionary choice about whether to defend the Constitution against a more remote
possibility. But if the President concludes that Congress intends that its bill have a wholly
unconstitutional application (at least as the President understands the Constitution), then he
must veto the bill.
' My colleague, Michael Rappaport, made similar arguments over a decade ago. See
Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 735,
766-76 (1993). He also makes comparable points in this symposium issue without
committing himself to the view that Presidents must veto unconstitutional legislation. See
Michael B. Rappaport, The Unconstitutionality of "Signing and Not Enforcing," 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 113 (2007).
6 Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01 (2006).
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The second possible source of a duty to veto is the President's unique oath to
"preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. 7 Read narrowly, the oath forbids
presidential transgressions of the Constitution. The President cannot violate the
Constitution because he would be acting contrary to his express duty to defend it.
This narrow reading of the oath reads it as establishing a presidential equivalent of
the Hippocratic Oath: "Do no constitutional harm."
Going further, the oath may require more than avoiding constitutional violations
and may require a defense of the Constitution, regardless of the source of the threat.
In other words, the oath may impose on the President an affirmative obligation to
thwart or prevent the constitutional violations of others. Using whatever constitu-
tional and statutory powers at his disposal, the President should obstruct and thwart
constitutional threats, whether they emanate from the states, foreign nations, private
parties, or Congress. On this theory, the oath supplements the implied obligation to
do no constitutional harm by expressly requiring the President to defend the
Constitution from external and internal threats.
Finally, the third potential source of a duty to veto is the Faithful Execution
Clause. The Clause requires that the President "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."' Because the Constitution purports to be law itself,9 it is subject to the
faithful execution duty. Hence, the President must see that the Constitution is faith-
fully executed no less than a tax or commerce statute. The Constitution is not
faithfully executed when the President violates the Constitution himself, assists the
violations of others, or remains passive while others violate it, or so the argument goes.
If one subscribes to either the broad theory of the implied prohibition against
constitutional violations, or the narrow presidential oath-based theory of the
President's obligation to do no constitutional harm, one should conclude that the
President must veto unconstitutional legislation because the President violates the
Constitution should he allow the unconstitutional bill to become law. That the
legislation was generated elsewhere is of no consequence because, when it is
presented to him, he has a choice to make. In particular, the President may either
veto the legislation or allow it to become law.' ° If he chooses the latter path of
inaction, the President has chosen to help usher in an unconstitutional law. Indeed,
few would think that a dormant, passive President is absolved of all responsibility
if an aide proposed an unconstitutional plan and told the President that she would
carry it into execution unless the President expressly ordered her to desist. My
' See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
8 See id. art. II, § 3.
9 See id. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.").
10 There are two ways in which the President allows a bill to become law, either by
signing the bill or by doing nothing. Signing the bill makes it law immediately. If the
President does nothing and lets ten days pass while Congress remains in session, the bill is
likewise new law. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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intuition is that most would denounce the President who remained mute or who,
worse yet, gave his sanction to the plan. The same rationale applies to Presidents
who fail to veto unconstitutional legislation. By not vetoing such legislation,
Presidents bear no small measure of responsibility for the provisions the bills
contain, including the unconstitutional provisions.
Furthermore, if one believes that either the presidential oath or the Faithful
Execution Clause1" requires an active defense of the Constitution, then the case for
reading the Constitution as requiring a veto of unconstitutional legislation is clearer
still. If either provision requires a defense of the Constitution, even when the threat
emanates from others, it surely requires a presidential veto of unconstitutional
legislation, because the President clearly has the ability to forestall unconstitutional
legislation with the veto. While there may be practical limits to the President's
affirmative obligation to thwart the unconstitutional acts of others, surely the veto
presents an easy case. Putting aside political and policy considerations, the President
can veto with little difficulty. To refrain from vetoing unconstitutional legislation
seems an abject act of presidential nonfeasance.
Consider the argument from a different perspective. Imagine a President who is
given an option by a state governor. The governor says that he will take some action
that the President regards as unconstitutional unless the President tells him to refrain
from the action. Whatever the extent of the duty to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution, the decision to remain mute in the face of the governor's option is
surely inconsistent with even a minimal view of the President's obligation to defend
the Constitution.
The idea that the Constitution imposes a duty to veto unconstitutional legislation
does not merely rest on a bare reading of text. Rather, early Presidents shared the
belief that the Constitution imposed upon them a duty to veto unconstitutional bills.
To begin with, consider George Washington's letter to Alexander Hamilton
regarding the Bank of the United States. In that letter, Washington noted that the
constitutionality of the proposed bank had been criticized by some of its opponents. 2
He noted, "[i]t therefore becomes more particularly my duty to examine the ground
on which the objection is built."' 3 Evidently, Washington thought that he had a duty
to examine the constitutionality of the bank once it became clear that its constitu-
tionality had been plausibly contested. Presumably, Washington did not believe that
he had a mere duty to examine the constitutionality of the bank bill without more.
Arguably, there would be little point in Washington conducting an extensive
consideration of the constitutional question if he did not believe that he had to veto
the bill if he ultimately concluded that it was unconstitutional. In other words, if
" See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; id. art. II, § 3.
12 Letter from George Washington to Alexander Hamilton (Feb. 16, 1791), in 31
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 215 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
"3 Id. at 216.
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Washington believed that he had discretion to veto (or not veto) bills he regarded
as unconstitutional, he would have been quite mistaken in supposing that he had a
"duty" to consider the constitutionality of a statute. It seems that Washington under-
stood that his duty to the Constitution encompassed an obligation to examine the
constitutionally of the bill and a complementary duty to veto it if he concluded that
it was unconstitutional. Consistent with this claim, there is no instance of Washington
allowing a bill containing unconstitutional provisions to become law. To the
contrary, one of his two vetoes was issued solely for constitutional reasons.4
Thomas Jefferson's opinion on the Bank of the United States seems of the same
view. Jefferson argued that the veto "is the shield provided by the constitution to
protect against the invasions of the legislature [of] 1. the rights of the Executive 2.
of the Judiciary 3. of the states and state legislatures."'' 5 While it is possible to view
Jefferson as merely arguing that the President could choose to veto unconstitutional
statutes, the better reading is that Jefferson believed that the Constitution required
the President to use his shield to protect the Constitution.1 6 Indeed, the very fact that
all three opinions Washington received-from Jefferson, Hamilton, and Edmund
Randolph-only considered the constitutionality of the bank perhaps suggests that
these gentlemen understood that Washington had no choice if he found the bank
14 See George Washington, Veto Message (Apr. 5, 1792), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 124, 124 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
15 See Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 245, 247 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
16 To counter Jefferson's statement that the President is obligated to veto a bill on consti-
tutional grounds, the Office of Legal Counsel notes that Jefferson signed a bill that
appropriated funds for the Louisiana Purchase even though he doubted the constitutionality
of the purchase. See Dellinger Memorandum, supra note 1. But this fails to understand that
Jefferson perhaps viewed himself as violating the Constitution by negotiating and ratifying
the Louisiana treaty. As Jefferson would explain later, "A strict observance of the written
laws is doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but is not the highest. The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher
obligation." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in 11 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 146, 146 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1905). In other words,
Jefferson believed that sometimes the Constitution ought to be violated if such violation
served the purpose of self-preservation. Having violated the Constitution by ratifying the
Louisiana Purchase (at least in his own mind), Jefferson was hardly going to veto an
appropriation designed to carry the Treaty into execution. One violation inexorably begat
another, all justified by a belief that sometimes constitutional dictates are trumped by more
practical considerations. Hence, Jefferson had the view that sometimes it was okay for
practical considerations to trump constitutional obligation and did not subscribe to the
alternate view that the President had no constitutional obligation to defend the Constitution
against unconstitutional law. Therefore, in signing the Louisiana Purchase and its ancillary
legislation, Jefferson did violate the Constitution, at least as he understood it.
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unconstitutional.17 None of them opined that the President could choose to sign the
bank bill even if he regarded parts of it unconstitutional.
Presidents James Madison, James Monroe, and Andrew Jackson held the view
that Presidents were obliged to veto legislation containing unconstitutional pro-
visions. Even though he supported the policy goals of an internal improvements
bill, James Madison asserted that he had "no option" but to veto it because it was
unconstitutional. 18 "I am constrained by the insuperable difficulty I feel in recon-
ciling the bill with the Constitution of the United States to return it with that
objection," he wrote. 9 In another context, Madison said that he "could not have
otherwise discharged [his] duty" except by vetoing a bill that he believed violated
the Establishment Clause. 0
James Monroe held the same view of constitutional obligation. In his veto
message of the Cumberland Road bill, Monroe wrote:
[I]t is with deep regret, approving, as I do, the policy, that I am
compelled to object to its passage, and to return the bill to the
House of Representatives, in which it originated, under a
conviction that Congress do [sic] not possess the power, under
the constitution, to pass such a law.2'
And in his famous veto of a Bank of the United States bill, Andrew Jackson
considered it a duty of the President to veto bills that he regarded as unconstitutional.22
Notwithstanding the textual and historical arguments against Sign and
Denounce, three arguments might be thought to justify the practice. 3 The first, and
perhaps most potent for some, is that unbroken recent practice arguably demonstrates
'7 See Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 23,1791),
in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 247; Edmund Randolph, Opinion on
the Constitution of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank (Feb. 12, 1791), available at
http://memory.loc.gov/mss/mgw/mgw2/032/0940094.jpg.
18 See James Madison, Veto Message (Mar. 3, 1817), in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra
note 14, at 584, 585.
I9 d. at 584.
20 See Letter from James Madison to Baptist Churches (June 3, 1811), in 2 LETrERS AND
OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 511, 511 (1865).
21 James Monroe, Message to the House of Representatives (May 4, 1822), in 15 U.S.
HOUSE JOURNAL 560 (1822).
22 See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 14, at 567, 582, 591 (claiming that "[it is as much the duty of the House of
Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of
any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval as it is of the
supreme judges when it may be brought before them for judicial decision" and noting that
by vetoing the bill he had fulfilled his "duty" to the nation).
23 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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that the President does not violate the Constitution when he signs bills containing
unconstitutional provisions. This can be couched as a claim about the Constitution's
meaning-the Constitution's text is not currently read as barring Sign and
Denounce, whatever that text might have meant at some earlier time. Or the claim
could just be that the Constitution, broadly understood to include the established
practices of government, rather clearly does not bar Sign and Denounce. Either
argument can be seen as a claim about the possibility of an evolving Constitution.
Whatever the Constitution might have provided for in the past, it now countenances
the Sign and Denounce practice because Presidents have engaged in that practice for
some time with rather little dissent. Although there would be some that might deny
that Sign and Denounce has become a generally accepted feature of our constitu-
tional regime, I choose not to contest the claim that recent practice has added a new
and shiny gloss to the Constitution.
Instead, I will consider the second and third claims. Recall that the second claim
supposes that it is unrealistic to require the President to veto bills merely because
one or more of their provisions are unconstitutional.24 Bills may be hundreds or
thousands of pages long, containing numerous constitutional measures that often are
quite necessary from the point of view of government officials and private parties.
Indeed, the President will sometimes review bills that contain measures that he has
long championed. That being the case, it would be impractical to require the Presi-
dent to veto such bills merely because they contain one provision that the President
regards as unconstitutional.25
This narrow focus on the President's decision at presentment is itself unrealistic
because it adopts a static and cramped view of the legislative process.26 It supposes
that if the President vetoes a bill because one provision is unconstitutional, then the
many constitutional, quite popular, and needed provisions will never see the light
of day. But nothing in our system dictates this unpalatable binary choice. To begin
with, Congress might, in response to a veto, enact amended legislation that omits the
portions that the President regards as unconstitutional. Hence the vital provisions
might yet become law, albeit with a short delay. So Presidents need not necessarily
24 Bradley & Posner, supra note 1, at 341; see also posting of David Barron et al. to
Georgetown Law Faculty Blog, Untangling the Debate on Signing Statements, http://gulcfac
.typepad.com/georgetown university-law/2006/07/thanks to-thep.html (July 31, 2006).
25 This argument seems akin to the criminal defense of justification. Because the
President has really good reasons to sign the bill, his signature should not be regarded as an
unconstitutional or improper decision. The argument perhaps implies that where some bill
is not really necessary or highly prized, the justification defense would not be available. If
a bill is full of unnecessary public works spending and also contains an unconstitutional
provision, maybe the justification defense is unavailing. Cf. Barron et al., supra note 24,
(claiming that if the entire bill is facially unconstitutional the President does have to veto it).
26 See Rappaport, supra note 5.
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face the dilemma of choosing between defending the Constitution or securing
necessary legislation.
More realistically, the President may help shape legislation prior to presentment.
Through Statements of Administration Policy,27 staff and presidential discussions
with members of Congress, and public statements, the President may influence
legislation. Among other things, he can threaten to veto legislation that contains
unconstitutional measures, just as he threatens to veto legislation that contains
provisions that he objects to on policy grounds. Should the President issue veto threats
before presentment, he has the ability to convince or coerce Congress to remove the
provisions that he regards as unconstitutional. And if he succeeds in persuading
Congress, there will be no constitutionally based veto at the presentment stage.
Interestingly, to the extent that the President is willing to sign into law
provisions that he regards as unconstitutional, that willingness makes it more likely
that Congress will pass provisions that the President regards as unconstitutional. If
members of Congress know that the President has a history of ultimately signing
bills that contain provisions that the President regards as unconstitutional, they may
well scoff at the President's concerns about the constitutionality of proposed legis-
lation. In particular, members will know that, at the end of the day, the President is
not typically going to allow constitutional objections to come in the way of a bill the
President wants for other reasons. Hence, it may well be that the President has far less
influence or sway when it comes to provisions that he deems unconstitutional because
members of Congress can predict that the President will typically sign a bill rather
than veto it.2"
Of course, one must admit that whenever the President vetoes legislation (or
threatens a veto during congressional debate), there is a chance that whatever pro-
visions the President (and society) favors might not make their way into another law
in the foreseeable future. On certain occasions, the provisions that the President regards
as unconstitutional may be seen by members of Congress as absolutely necessary
27 In Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), the administration conveys the views
of the President's advisors on the desirability of legislation considered by Congress. These
SAPs often contain veto threats. If the legislation contains provisions fervently opposed by
the President's administration, the advisors will recommend that the President veto the bill.
Or if the legislation fails to contain provisions demanded by the President, the advisors will
likewise recommend a veto.
28 To be sure, the President may denounce certain provisions as unconstitutional and
refuse to enforce them. Yet these provisions still arguably have the status of law, and the courts
and future Presidents might enforce them. Indeed, the very same President who complains
about the constitutionality of a bill's provision might yet enforce it, as happened during the
Clinton administration. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitu-
tionally Objectionable Statutes, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 7, 13
(discussing how Clinton planned to enforce a provision he regarded as unconstitutional but
did not have to because Congress repealed the provision).
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components of any legislation. Hence, if the President vetoes a bill (or threatens its
veto during congressional deliberations), the provisions he desires may never
become law.
Even admitting this, however, there remains the question of whether the President
can escape censure for failing to veto an unconstitutional bill merely because he
thinks the remainder of the bill is highly desirable. If there is an implicit necessity
justification such that the President does not transgress his constitutional obligations
by failing to veto an unconstitutional bill, there is no reason to think that this
justification applies only to the presentment context. Instead, if there is a necessity
or exigent circumstances justification, it should be equally applicable to all sorts of
executive decisions. For instance, imagine a President who locks up people for very
compelling reasons, even though they have not been convicted of anything and even
though the Congress has not suspended habeas corpus. If we accept the necessity
justification, this President has done nothing wrong because the necessity of the
situation makes what would ordinarily be a constitutional violation a wholly
justifiable constitutional action. Or consider a President who believes that funds must
be immediately expended without a congressional appropriation because the security
of the United States is threatened. Under the necessity justification, the President
does nothing wrong by making an unauthorized Treasury withdrawal, because the
situation excuses his conduct such that he has not violated the Constitution at all.29
I think the Constitution is better understood as generally providing rules that
cannot be circumvented even in emergencies. As a matter of supreme law, the
President cannot withdraw funds from the Treasury without a congressional appropri-
ation.3 When he does so, he acts unconstitutionally. Should he have extremely
good reasons for his Treasury raid, Congress (and those it represents) may excuse
his violation. But their excusal or willingness to look the other way would not mean
that the President has not violated the Constitution. It would only suggest an entirely
understandable failure to hold the President accountable for his violation.
To go back to the practice of Sign and Denounce, it may well be that after having
threatened to veto a bill because it contains an unconstitutional provision, the
President may feel compelled to sign the final bill because it contains vital funding
for a war or a national disaster. By failing to veto the bill, the President has violated
his oath to defend the Constitution. It would then be up to the people and their Con-
gress to decide whether any punishment was appropriate for the President.32 The
29 But see Jefferson, supra note 16, at 147 (describing how Congress retroactively
excused Jefferson's expenditure of funds in the absence of an appropriation).
30 See generally Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1299 (2004) (arguing that suspending protections even during emergencies is the
first step towards constitutional suicide).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.").
32 See id. art. II, § 4; id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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more often the President invokes the necessity justification for Sign and Denounce,
the more the public would be wary of the claim that each of the bills the President
signed and denounced are actually necessary. I suspect that many of the bills signed
and then denounced by recent Presidents were hardly necessary, even giving these
Presidents the benefit of any doubt. It has become too easy to Sign and Denounce,
thus making it unnecessary to stand on constitutional principle and veto bills that
contain unconstitutional provisions.
The third and final claim said to justify the Sign and Denounce practice consists
of the argument that because no consequences arise from an unconstitutional pro-
vision of a statute, there is no harm in signing a bill that contains such provisions.
The claim is that the unconstitutional provision, if it really is unconstitutional, is
void ab initio such that it never gets enforced or acted upon.33
This argument misfires for three reasons. First, consider the courts. Parties injured
by the President's refusal to enforce a supposedly unconstitutional statute may go
to court and try to obtain an injunction requiring the administration to enforce the
provision the President regards as unconstitutional. If the court disagrees with the
President's conclusion, it will enjoin members of the executive branch to enforce the
statute. Given traditional understandings ofjudicial power and the President's implied
duty towards judgments, the President will honor such an injunction and his admini-
stration will be forced to execute a statutory provision that the President regards as
unconstitutional. In most situations, the President could have prevented this possi-
bility by vetoing the bill; his failure to do so could lead to him executing a provision
that he regards as wholly unconstitutional.
Second, later Presidents may well disagree with the current President's consti-
tutional views such that a future administration may enforce provisions that were
formerly regarded as unconstitutional.34 Imagine a President dedicated to civil rights
who allows some legislation curbing civil liberties to become law with the under-
standing that his administration will not treat the provision as law. His law and order
successor may well use the statute to vigorously curb civil liberties. Or imagine a
President opposed to affirmative action provisions that require the federal govern-
ment to hire using racial goals and timetables. Even though this President may
ignore the provisions that he signed into law on the grounds that they are unconstitu-
tional, a future President with a different constitutional approach may implement
those affirmative action provisions with gusto.
Third, even a President who believes that some statutory provision is void may
decide that he should enforce it out of a sense that the issue should be resolved by
the courts. For example, even though President Clinton thought that a provision
" See Bradley & Posner, supra note 1, at 339; Rappaport, supra note 5, at 773.
3' Rappaport, supra note 5, at 774.
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related to HIV testing was unconstitutional, he nonetheless pledged to enforce it as
a means of securing a judicial decision on the provision's unconstitutionality.35
Put simply, Sign and Denounce does not necessarily imply that the current
President "Sign, Denounce, and Ignore" the unconstitutional provisions. And even
if it did, the President cannot guarantee that the unconstitutional provision will never
be enforced by his administration or his successors. All this suggests that when a
President signs some bill into law that contains unconstitutional provisions on the
grounds that those provisions are void and thus provide no reason to veto the entire
bill, the President generates a situation fraught with constitutional danger. The risk
is that the President's views regarding the Constitution will not be vindicated
because in signing an unconstitutional bill into law, the President essentially allows
others an opportunity to opine on the provision's constitutionality. And giving these
other actors an opportunity to opine might mean that either the President will have
to enforce a statute he regards as unconstitutional or future Presidents will enforce
a statute that the current President thinks is unconstitutional.
Another means of evaluating the common defenses of Sign and Denounce is to
apply those defenses to other situations and gauge whether the implications of the
Sign and Denounce practice withstand scrutiny in these other contexts. First, consider
members of Congress. If Sign and Denounce is constitutional for the reasons given,
it seems that it would be permissible for members to vote for legislation that they
believed contained unconstitutional measures on the grounds that the rest of the
legislation is really important and that the unconstitutional provisions are void anyway.
Moreover, it would be constitutionally permissible for members of Congress to vote
for a bill whose entire contents they regard as unconstitutional because the entire bill
should be understood as void ab initio and, hence, of no consequence. In effect,
voting for such a bill is like voting for a non-binding "sense of the Senate" resolution.
Such hypotheticals may not trouble defenders of Sign and Denounce, for many of them
may suppose that members of Congress already engage in this kind of pragmatic
calculus. If members think this way, we are all the worse off for it, for, as noted earlier,
it increases the likelihood that bills and statutes will contain provisions that many
members regard as unconstitutional.
Next, consider the President. Under the logic of the Sign and Denounce defenses,
may the President propose legislation containing provisions that he regards as
unconstitutional? For instance, can the President propose omnibus legislation that,
among other things, authorizes the Secretary of Defense to appoint the Secretary of
State, in violation of the implicit constitutional requirement that the President
nominate and the Senate confirm all non-inferior officers? It may seem that under
these defenses, he may propose such legislation when it would be crucial to securing
the votes of members of Congress necessary to secure passage of a bill that contained
other provisions that the President deems vital. Moreover, the President, like members
35 See Johnsen, supra note 28, at 13.
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of Congress, may propose legislation that he regards as entirely unconstitutional
because every provision will be void ab initio. The President need not feel guilty
about his advocacy of such a bill precisely because the unconstitutional provisions
are void. Without hesitation, he can advocate such legislation to burnish his public
image even though he regards the legislation as unconstitutional.
Moreover, as noted earlier, the necessity defense cannot be cabined to the
presentment context. If it is true that the President does not violate the Constitution
when he signs an unconstitutional bill because the necessity of the bill's other
provisions are an excuse, then this necessity defense applies equally to all manner of
presidential actions in other contexts. Many presidential actions that seem uncon-
stitutional may actually be entirely proper if necessity cures or excuses the seeming
constitutional violation.
Lastly, consider the courts. If Sign and Denounce is constitutional because of the
necessity justification, the Supreme Court (and other courts) can likewise issuejudg-
ments and opinions that admit that some statute is unconstitutional, but nonetheless
enforce the statute on the grounds that the statute's enforcement is crucially important.
Indeed, one can imagine a Supreme Court Justice concurring in a judgment (and
providing the crucial fifth vote for the judgment), even as she agrees with a dissent
that a particular statute, upon which the judgment is based, is wholly unconstitu-
tional. Her concurrence is constitutional even as she knowingly helps enforce an
unconstitutional statute because the necessity of the thing justifies her concurrence.
CONCLUSION
It is easy to see why many have few qualms about Sign and Denounce. First,
many have grown accustomed to the idea that the courts play the primary, if not the
exclusive, role in defending the Constitution. Indeed, some perhaps suppose that
Presidents and Congresses intrude upon the judiciary's bailiwick if they even opine
on constitutional matters. Given the sense that constitutional defense is the judiciary's
job, it almost seems unnecessary for the President to take vigorous stands against
congressional legislation.
Second, Sign and Denounce has a "have your cake and eat it too" dimension.
The President gets to denounce certain portions of an act as unconstitutional but does
not risk losing those portions of the act that are constitutional. He gets to pose as a
constitutional defender while doing the bare minimum when it comes to such defense.
Finally, there are other values besides constitutional principle, and it may seem
unwise, even foolish, to sacrifice significant policies and goals at the altar of con-
stitutional principle. Presidents who do not veto a bill containing provisions they
regard as unconstitutional clearly prefer the rest of the bill even if they have to
enforce provisions they regard as unconstitutional.
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Still this understandable attitude about the costs associated with standing on
constitutional principle does little to justify the very different claim that the
Constitution actually sanctions decisions that seem to countenance constitutional
violations on the grounds that those violations are necessary or the claim that attempted
constitutional violations are automatically void and therefore of no moment.
I am leery of arguments that claim that constitutional actors do not violate the
Constitution when they have extremely good reasons for taking actions that ordinarily
would violate the Constitution. And I am likewise wary of the excuse that govern-
ment officials can propose, vote for, advocate, and sign into law unconstitutional
provisions of law because those provisions are void anyway and hence such actions
are not censurable.
Far better for Presidents who sign bills containing provisions that are unconsti-
tutional to just admit that their signature (and their corresponding failure to veto)
does violate the Constitution and then throw themselves at the mercy of the public.
That kind of necessity excuse--one that does not deny a violation-is far more
consistent with the Constitution. And it might also have the salutary effect of limiting
decisions to violate the Constitution to situations where it can truly be said that there
actually were exigent circumstances that mightjustify Sign and Denounce. As it stands
now, the rather unconstrained use of Sign and Denounce allows Presidents to pay
lip service to the Constitution while exhibiting rather little fealty to it. The now all-
too-familiar scenario of Presidents who chastise Congresses while simultaneously
signing unconstitutional bills into law does little to inspire constitutional confidence.
